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Abstract
In this work project, we use micro-level data from the Household Budget Survey
waves of 2005, 2010 and 2015 to analyze the evolution and measure the extent of
progressivity of two main components of the indirect tax system in Portugal: VAT
and excise duties. By means of an analysis of income deciles, we observe variations
in the composition of households’ expenditure per tax level and per commodity
aggregate. According to the income-based Kakwani progressivity index and to pro-
gressivity curves, the global indirect tax system in Portugal can be considered to
be regressive. The graphical decomposition into tax components reveals that this
is due to a regressive VAT structure. Our findings also suggest that the use of the
reduced VAT rate in itself has a redistributive impact.
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1 Introduction
Consumption taxes compose approximately 30% of the total taxes collected in OECD
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries and they commonly
fall into two sub-categories: (i) general taxes on goods and services (value-added taxes
and retail sales taxes) and (ii) taxes on specific goods and services. The latter includes
excise taxes, customs and import duties and taxes on specific services (OECD, 2018). In
Portugal, according to OECD statistics, the share of taxes in GDP was 34.3% in 2016.
In the same year, revenues from value-added taxes (VAT) as a percentage of total tax
revenue was 24.8%.
Over the last decades, the tax structure of many countries has fundamentally changed.
Consumption taxes have become a growing source of revenue, particularly the VAT, which
are now in force in all OECD countries, except in the United States.
The discussion about tax progressivity can be based both on normative and positive
terms. The optimal degree of tax progressivity is a normative-based decision, driven
by political, social and ethical factors. From a distributional point of view, it is well
known that consumption-based taxes are usually regressive because they affect low-income
earners more heavily than individuals with higher incomes.
Blum and Kalven (1954) comment on progressive taxation and equality: “However
uncertain other aspects of progression may be, there is one thing about it that is certain.
A progressive tax on income necessarily operates to lessen the inequalities in the distri-
bution of that income. In fact (...), progression cannot be defined meaningfully without
reference to its redistributive effect on wealth or income. It would seem therefore that
any consideration of progression must at some time confront the issue of equality.”
This work project aims to estimate the progressivity of the indirect tax system and
its evolution over time, by looking at the burden of VAT and excise taxes on different
Portuguese households. The structure of the work project is as follows. Section 2 provides
a literature review. Section 3 specifies the underlying theoretical framework. Section 4
gives a succinct description of the indirect tax system in Portugal, including VAT and
excise components. Section 5 introduces the data used, presents the methodology and
the underlying assumptions to compute the households’ indirect tax liabilities. Section 6
provides a data analysis by income deciles. Section 7 contains the main findings. Section
8 contains the conclusions, some limitations of the work project and potential areas for
further research.
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2 Literature Review
There is a predictable unequal distribution of tax liabilities across households when we
have a clear difference between consumption patterns and a differentiated indirect tax
structure.
Value-added taxes and excise duties are usually seen as regressive, at least from a
distributional point of view. Wagstaff et al. (1999) use the Kakwani index to measure
the indirect tax progressivity in many OECD countries. All their estimates are negative
except for Spain in 1980, suggesting a clear regressive indirect tax system.
Decoster (2005), using data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS),
that includes both quantities consumed and expenditures for many commodity goods, as-
sesses the distributional consequences of VAT and excises taxes and concludes that indirect
taxes in Russia are progressive.
A recent study for 20 OECD countries concludes that VAT is either proportional
or slightly progressive when measured as a share of expenditure and generally regressive
when measured as a share of income. It also shows that the combined impact of the excise
taxes tends to be regressive (OECD, 2014). This study uses micro data on households’
expenditure and is based on consumption tax micro-simulation models.
Caspersen and Metcalf (1993) measure the lifetime incidence of VAT using both con-
sumption and income data. When making an annual income-based tax incidence analy-
sis, the authors find that expenditure-based taxes look quite regressive. However, when
making an analysis based on lifetime income, their findings suggest that VAT would be
proportional to slightly progressive over the lifetime.1
As regards Portugal, recent research by Matos (2018) estimates the progressivity of the
Portuguese income and value-added taxes using data from the Household Budget Survey
wave of 2010, applying a net-gross conversion proposed by Farinha Rodrigues (2007).
Income taxes are found to be progressive and VAT2 is found to be regressive. Braz and
Correira da Cunha (2009) instead use the Household Budget Survey wave of 2005 and
find that VAT is regressive on income (caused by the decreasing average propensity to
consume), and progressive on expenditure. Additionally, O’Donoghue et al. (2004) use
an income-based approach to compare VAT progressivity across 12 European countries.
By means of EUROMOD3 income tax microsimulation models for those countries, the
authors find that the Portuguese VAT is the most regressive.
1Kakinaka and Pereira (2006) use a less traditional approach to measure tax progressivity. The authors
use a volatility-based index, assessing tax progressivity without any information about tax burden and
income distributions. The only information required is time series data on aggregate tax revenue and on
aggregate income.
2This VAT is the one that is paid by the service providers.
3EUROMOD is a tax-benefit microsimulation model for the EU countries and it employs underlying
EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC).
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3 Theoretical Framework
This section introduces some notation that will be used in the remainder of the work
project, for the sake of clarity.
In a market economy, income is earned and spent by N individuals and it is generally
expressed in monetary terms. Gross income, Y , ranges from [0,+∞] and is distributed
across the population according to a given density function, fY (y), and the respective
cumulative distribution function, FY (y) = Pr(Y ≤ y). The quantile function of Y , i.e.
the inverse of the distribution function, is given as QY (p) = F
−1
Y (p), with p ∈ [0, 1]. For
continuous values of Y , the Lorenz curve is expressed as (Jann, 2016):
LY (p) =
∑N
i=1 YiI{Yi ≤ QpY }∑N
i=1 Yi
(1)
where I{Z} is an indicator function being equal to 1 if Z is true and 0 otherwise.
Intuitively, a specific point on the Lorenz curve expresses the share of gross income of
the poorest p · 100% of the population.
The Lorenz curve of income refers cumulative income proportions of population mem-
bers ranked by the values of Y . Using an alternative ranking variable, T , while still
measuring outcome in terms of income, leads to the so-called concentration curve. Graph-
ically, this concentration curve is drawn by representing the cumulative distribution of
T , FT (t), on the vertical axis against FY (y), on the horizontal axis. Analytically, the
concentration curve of income with respect to T can be defined as (Jann, 2016):
CT (p) =
∑N
i=1 YiI{Ti ≤ QpT}∑N
i=1 Yi
(2)
where QT (p) is the p-quantile of T ’s distribution. The corresponding concentration index
is defined as twice the area between the concentration curve and the line of equality, i.e.
the 45-degree diagonal4:
C(T ) = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
CT (p) dp (3)
Household spending, S, is the “amount of final consumption expenditure made by
households to meet their everyday needs” (OECD definition) and is a function of Y ,
S(Y ). Household spending is evaluated at the price the buyer actually pays at the time
of the purchase, comprising non-deductible VAT and other taxes. These consumption
taxes are a function of household spending, T (S(Y )). Each household ends up with the
4The diagonal means that the distribution of taxes is neutral: if the distribution of taxes overlaps this
diagonal, the poorest 10% burden 10% of the tax; the poorest 20% burden 20% of the tax, and so on.
This line reflects perfect equality in the distribution of taxes and it is also known as perfect equality line.
The distribution of taxes is considered to be regressive if the poorest groups burden a higher percentage
of taxes than the higher-income groups.
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following budget constraint:
Y = S(Y ) + T (S(Y )) + τ(Y ) (4)
where τ(Y ) are income taxes.
The marginal tax rate of consumption is given by T ′(S) = ∂T (S)
∂S
, which is equivalent
to the derivative of the consumption tax liability function and the average tax rate of
consumption is the ratio between consumption taxes and total consumption spending,
T (S)
S
.
Lorenz curves and concentration curves are widely used tools for the analysis of eco-
nomic inequality and redistribution. In his book, Vickrey (1947) states that “progressive
taxation may be defined as taxation which tends to promote economic equality (i.e., a
more equal distribution of income, wealth, consumption, or other measure of economic
status)”. A tax is considered progressive if there is less burden on the poorer. There are
two equivalent definitions for tax progressivity: (i) progressivity happens where average
tax rates are increasing with income; (ii) progressivity happens where marginal tax rates
are greater than average tax rates (Musgrave and Thin, 1948).
The most common measures of progressivity are usually divided in two different cate-
gories: (i) the distributional progressivity indices, which estimate the “disproportionality
of tax payments relative to pre-tax incomes” and are based on the tax rate configuration
and on the income distribution within the population; and (ii) the structural progressiv-
ity indices, which measure “the difference between pre-and post-tax income distributions”
and depend on the tax rate structure (Martins, 2016).
The most usual measure of inequality is the Gini index, G(Y ), which is the Gini
coefficient expressed as a percentage. Graphically, the Gini index compares the Lorenz
curve, LY , that represents the distribution of income, with the Lorenz curve that we would
get without inequality. After rearranging, we get G(Y ) in terms of LY :
G(Y ) = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
LY dY (5)
Kakwani (1977) proposed an index to measure the progressivity of taxes, using the
Gini framework: it is calculated using the “difference in the Lorenzian income inequality
and Lorenzian tax inequality” (Formby et al., 1981). In analytical terms, the Kakwani
index is given by:
KT = C(T )−G(Y ) (6)
where KT is the Kakwani index of progressivity of tax T , C(T ) is the index from the
concentration of T and G(Y ) is the Gini index of gross income. Theoretically, the Kakwani
index ranges from [-1,1]: the larger the index is, the more progressive is the tax system.
Huesca and Araar (2014) use a theoretical framework to assess and analyze the stochas-
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tic dominance of progressivity conditions. They show that progressivity curves are at-
tained through the comparison of the Lorenz curve of gross income and the concentration
curve of taxes at percentile p by TR(p):
TR(p) = LY (p)− CT (p) (7)
where TR(p) ranges from [−2, 2], where −2 means perfect regressivity and 2 means perfect
progressivity (Huesca and Araar, 2014).
4 The Portuguese Indirect Tax System
This section presents the main characteristics of the Portuguese indirect tax system.
Figure 1 describes how VAT and excise revenues have evolved during the last years in
Portugal.
4.1 Value-added taxes
In the European Union (EU), the VAT is a general, broadly based consumption tax on
all goods and services. Since it was implemented in France in the late 1940s, it has been
applied in several countries.
In Portugal, the VAT law is managed by the Portuguese Tax and Customs Authority
(known as Autoridade Tributa´ria e Aduaneira), and it has a special code: (i) Co´digo
do Imposto sobre o Valor Acrescentado (CIVA) and (ii) Regime de IVA nas Transacc¸o˜es
Intracomunita´rias (RITI). In Portugal, the VAT was introduced when the country entered
the EU in 1986. As member state of the EU, Portugal bases its tax law on regulations
drawn up at the European level.5 Currently, there are three VAT rates: the standard
rate of 23%, the intermediate rate of 13% and the reduced rate of 6%. However, the
Autonomous Regions of the Azores and Madeira have lower taxes of, respectively, 18%
and 22% for the standard one, 4% and 5% for the reduced and 9% and 12% for the
intermediate one.
The reduced rate is applied to several commodities like basic food, water supply, spe-
cific pharmaceutical products, certain newspapers, periodicals and books, medical equip-
ment for disabled, medical services (if not exempt), hotels and similar services, social
housing and many agriculture products and services; the intermediate rate is applied to
some other food, wine, mineral water, diesel fuel for agriculture, machinery mainly used
in agricultural production and admission to cultural events; the standard rate is imposed
on most goods and services. Additionally, there are goods and services that are exempt
from VAT: housing costs, health expenditures and education expenditures.
5Although Portugal is required to comply the VAT code of the EU, the country still sets the level of
its own VAT rate. There is only one requirement: is has to be greater than 15%.
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Table 1 describes the VAT rates that were in force in the years considered in this
analysis.
Table 1: VAT Rates in Portugal
Mainland Portugal A. R. of the Azores A. R. of Madeira
Reduced Rate 5% 4% 4%
2005 Intermediate Rate 12% 8% 8%
Standard Rate 19% 13% 13%
Reduced Rate 5% 4% 4%
2009 Intermediate Rate 12% 8% 8%
Standard Rate 20% 14% 14%
Reduced Rate 6% 5% 5%
2014 Intermediate Rate 13% 10% 12%
Standard Rate 23% 18% 22%
Note: We assume VAT rates before the new VAT schedule of July 2005.
Source: Tax and Customs Authority, 2018.
4.2 Excise duties
Excise taxes are levied on certain types of commodities. In Portugal, these commodities
can be alcohol and alcoholic beverages, beer, tobacco products, oil and gas. The Por-
tuguese tax system covers two types of excise taxes: (i) specific taxes, which impose a
fixed amount of euros for each unit of product, regardless of the price charged (e.g. per
hectoliter or grams) and (i) ad valorem taxes, that are levied based on the value (price) of
the product. Figure 1 reveals the importance of revenues from oil products taxes, which
accounted for about 60% of total excise revenues in 2016. Conversely, in the case of com-
modities such as beer and alcoholic beverages, this share is not significant (around 5% of
total excise revenues).
In Portugal, the tax on alcohol and alcoholic beverages is generally known as imposto
sobre o a´lcool e as bebidas alcoo´licas (IABA) and it is levied on alcoholic beverages (beer,
Table 2: Tax on alcohol and alcoholic beverages in 2018
Product Limit
Beer From e 7.75/hl to e 27.24/hl
Wine and other fermented and sparkling beverages e 0
Intermediate products e 70.74/hl
Ethyl alcohol e 1,251.72/hl
Spirit drinks e 1,289.27/hl
Source: AICEP Portugal Global.
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Figure 1: Evolution of indirect tax revenues in Portugal
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Table 3: Tax on tobacco products in 2018
Product Tax
Cigarettes
• Specific element is e 88.20
(e 16.30 in the Azores and e 58 in Madeira)
• Ad valorem element is 17%
(38% in the Azores and 10% in Madeira)
Cigars and cigarillos Ad valorem element is 20%
Fine cut tobaccos and other tobaccos
• Specific element is e 0.065/g
• Ad valorem element is 20%
Source: AICEP Portugal Global.
wines, spirit drinks and other fermented beverages) and on ethyl alcohol. The respective
tax rates applicable to such commodities are presented in Table 2.
The tax on tobacco products, known as imposto sobre o tabaco (IT), is charged on
cigarettes and smoking tobaccos, cigars and cigarillos, and fine cut tobaccos. The current
taxes that are applicable to these commodities are described in Table 3.
The tax on oil and energetic products or imposto sobre os produtos petrol´ıferos e
energe´ticos (ISP) is charged on the oil and energetic commodities and “any other products
that are used as fuel or carburant in any type of non-stationary engine.”
The vehicle tax (known as Imposto sobre Ve´ıculos or ISV) is a “registration tax levied
upon the release of vehicles for private consumption.”
8
5 Data and Methodology
This section describes the consumption tax microsimulation model adapted from Decoster
(2005). First, we describe and discuss the data employed in this work project, the compu-
tation of households’ indirect tax liabilities and the output of the microsimulation model.
Lastly, we state the underlying assumptions of the model and some of its limitations.
5.1 The Portuguese household budget survey
This work project uses expenditure micro-data from the Household Budget Survey (HBS),
more specifically the 2005-2006, 2010-2011 and 2015-2016 waves (being 2015-2016 the
latest available one). They include information from, respectively, 10, 403, 9, 489 and
11, 398 households and from 28, 359, 24, 383 and 29, 091 individuals.
The Household Budget Survey is conducted every five years by Statistics Portugal
(Instituto Nacional de Estat´ıstica). In Portugal, it is known as Inque´rito a`s Despesas
das Famı´lias (IOF/IDEF) and it provides detailed information on income distribution of
households (including disposable income) and the level and structure of their expenditures,
as well as their residence accommodation comfort. It also reports their socio-economic
and demographic characteristics.
Any economic study on the distribution of income is directly affected by the method
that researches use to measure inequality. As explained by Figini (1998), one of the
key concerns related to these studies is the evaluation of the direction and variations in
inequality when changes in the composition and size of households are allowed. The usual
way in the literature to correct for household size is using equivalence scales, which take
into account scale economies within the household. In this analysis, we use the OECD-
Modified Scale because it is the current standard scale for OECD and Eurostat. The
equivalised disposable income is then computed by dividing total household income by
the respective equivalence scale.
The collection of information is made through in-person interviews. Expenditure data
is collected by survey papers and the detailed description associated with each consump-
tion expenditure was collected and analyzed for coding in the framework of the Classifi-
cation of Individual Consumption by Purpose (COICOP).6 In the 2005-2006, 2010-2011
and 2015-2016 waves, expenditure data is based on consumption of 201, 199, 301 goods
and services, respectively. Table 7 summarizes the commodity breakdown used for the
microsimulation model.
Consumption expenditures are based on four types of periodicity: (i) annually, ap-
plicable to goods or services purchased with reduced frequency, such as hospital services
6The COICOP is a “classification developed by the United Nations Statistics Division to classify
and analyze individual consumption expenditures incurred by households, non-profit institutions serving
households and general government according to their purpose. It includes categories such as clothing
and footwear, housing, water, electricity, and gas and other fuels” (Eurostat definition).
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or car/ insurance purchase; (ii) quarterly, applicable to goods or services purchased sev-
eral times a year, but not monthly, such as expenses for clothing, footwear, repair and
maintenance of housing; (iii) monthly, applicable to monthly expenses such as leasing,
water supply, electricity, and certain types of transport services; (iv) fortnightly, applica-
ble to expenditure on goods and services frequently purchased, including food, beverages,
tobacco, non-durable household goods, fuels or expenses in restaurants and cafes. After
data collection, data on expenditure on goods or services were annualized by applying a
multiplicative factor which takes into account the number of periods in the year: 26 in
the case of periodicity being fortnightly, 12 in the case of monthly periodicity, and 4 in
the case of consumption a which is associated quarterly.
The Horvitz-Thompson estimator is used to estimate households’ weights. All our
estimates are corrected for sample weights.7
All forms of monetary income are reported as net-at-source income, which is the income
observed in monthly pay slips. Farinha Rodrigues (2007) says that there is evidence
showing that most individuals report this type of income. In this work project, we will
use net-at-source income as Braz and Correira da Cunha (2009).
Tables 4, 5 and 6 report descriptive statistics about the HBS.
7A sampling weight denote the inverse of the probability that an observation is included in the sample.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics - HBS 2005/2006
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Definition Units
Female 0.521 0.499 Female indicator -
Work 0.406 0.491 Employment indicator -
Higher Education 0.065 0.247 Higher education indicator -
Mainland Portugal 0.719 0.449 Indicator of residence in Mainland Portugal -
Azores 0.083 0.276 Indicator of residence in A. R. of the Azores -
Household Size1 0.163 0.369 Indicator when the household size is equal to 1 -
Household Size2 0.302 0.459 Indicator when the household size is equal to 2 -
Household Size3 0.214 0.410 Indicator when the household size is equal to 3 -
Income 20,615.31 17,935.14 Household annual disposable income e
Monetary Income 16,458.73 15,976.75 Household annual disposable monetary income e
Expenditure 16,184.00 12,246.99 Household annual expenditure e
Monetary Expenditure 12,027.44 10,477.28 Household annual monetary expenditure e
Source: HBS 2005/2006.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics - HBS 2010/2011
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Definition Units
Female 0.522 0.499 Female indicator -
Work 0.399 0.490 Employment indicator -
Higher Education 0.084 0.278 Higher education indicator -
Mainland Portugal 0.807 0.395 Indicator of residence in Mainland Portugal -
Azores 0.083 0.277 Indicator of residence in A. R. of the Azores -
Household Size1 0.202 0.402 Indicator when the household size is equal to 1 -
Household Size2 0.346 0.476 Indicator when the household size is equal to 2 -
Household Size3 0.227 0.419 Indicator when the household size is equal to 3 -
Income 21,987.85 16,042.64 Household annual disposable income e
Monetary Income 17,499.97 14,471.74 Household annual disposable monetary income e
Expenditure 18,492.87 13,134.92 Household annual expenditure e
Monetary Expenditure 14,004.99 11,522.14 Household annual monetary expenditure e
Source: HBS 2010/2011.
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics - HBS 2015/2016
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Definition Units
Female 0.524 0.499 Female indicator -
Work 0.387 0.487 Employment indicator -
Higher Education 0.129 0.335 Higher education indicator -
Mainland Portugal 0.761 0.426 Indicator of residence in Mainland Portugal -
Azores 0.128 0.335 Indicator of residence in A. R. of the Azores -
Household Size1 0.207 0.405 Indicator when the household size is equal to 1 -
Household Size2 0.339 0.473 Indicator when the household size is equal to 2 -
Household Size3 0.232 0.422 Indicator when the household size is equal to 3 -
Income 23,088.25 17,935.14 Household annual disposable income e
Monetary Income 17,979.54 16,297.15 Household annual disposable monetary income e
Expenditure 19,130.47 12,763.19 Household annual expenditure e
Monetary Expenditure 14,021.90 10,954.05 Household annual monetary expenditure e
Source: HBS 2015/2016.
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Table 7: Commodity aggregation by COICOP consumption chapters
Commodity Agreggate Commodity, Second Level
1. Food and non-alcoholic beverages
Food beverages
Non-alcoholic beverages
2. Alcoholic beverages and tobacco
Alcohol
Tobacco
Narcotics
3. Clothing and footwear
Clothing
Footwear
4. Housing, water, electricity and fuel
Effective rents
Subjective rents
Housing maintenance and housing repair
Water supply and related services
Eletricity and gas fuel
5. Furniture and household services
Textile products for domestic use
Household equipment
Crockery and other household utensils
Equipment for home and garden
Goods and services for the daily maintenance of housing
6. Health
Medicines and therapeutic material
Medical, paramedical and other non-hospital health services
Hospital services
7. Transport
Vehicle acquisition
Expenditure on the use of personal transport equipment
Transportation services
8. Communications
Postal services
Telecommunication equipment
Telephone and telefax services
9. Recreation, entertainment and leisure
Audiovisual, photographic and data processing equipment
Other durable goods for leisure, recreation and culture
Other items and equipment for recreation, gardening and pets
Recreational and cultural services
Newspapers, books and stationery
Holidays
10. Education
Early childhood education and elementary education
Middle and secondary education
Post-secondary education
Higher education
Other types of education
11. Accommodation services and restaurants
Meal services
Accommodation services
12. Other goods and services
Personal care
Prostitution services
Personal use items
Social protection
Insurance
Financial services
Other services
Note: Taxes liabilities have been calculated at the most disaggregated level.
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5.2 Households’ indirect tax liabilities
Following the model used by Decoster (2005), we start by matching each category of goods
and services in the sample to their corresponding indirect tax rates. It is important to
note that all calculations below are made based on the assumption that all goods and
services have a fixed price, i.e. producer prices do not vary.
The expression that shows us the relationship between the producer price of good i,
bi, and the consumer price, mi, is given by:
mi = (bi + di + aibi)(1 + vi) (8)
where di represents the excise per unit, ai the excise expressed as a share of bi and vi
represents the VAT rate. Solving Equation (8) in terms of bi, it follows that:
bi =
mi
(1 + vi)(1 + ai)
− di
(1 + ai)
(9)
The households’ indirect tax liabilities are not only dependent on the tax rates, but
also on the consumption pattern, i.e. the relationship between consumption categories
(e.g. food, clothing, footwear and health). Denoting xi as the quantity purchased of good
i, the respective tax liability Ti is written as:
Ti = (mi − bi)xi (10)
Since the HBS comprises households’ expenditures, which are dependent on mi, we
need to adjust Equation (3) so that we find an expression in terms of what is observable
(HBS does not observe bi). Therefore, by substituting Equation (9) on Equation (10), we
get households’ tax liabilities in terms of observable expenditures and of the parameters
of the tax system:
T hi =
vi
(1 + vi)(1 + ai)
Shi +
ai
1 + ai
Shi +
di
1 + ai
xhi (11)
where Shi = m
h
i x
h
i expresses the expenditure of household h on good i. The first term of
Equation (11) represents the VAT component and the second and third elements refer to
the excise component. Using Equation (11), the indirect tax liabilities for all households
in the HBS were computed.
Tax liabilities were calculated to the twelve commodity aggregates presented in Section
5 (see Table 7), based on the following approach: tax liabilities for each household for
commodity aggregate J is given by:
T hJ =
∑
j∈J
T hj (12)
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Table 8: Evolution of VAT schedule in Mainland Portugal
Date Reduced Rate Intermediate Rate Standard Rate Increased Rate
01/01/1986 0 8 16 30
01/02/1988 0 8 17 30
24/03/1992 - 5 16 30
01/01/1995 - 5 17 -
01/07/1996 5 12 17 -
05/06/2002 5 12 19 -
01/07/2005 5 12 21 -
01/07/2008 5 12 20 -
01/07/2010 6 13 21 -
01/01/2011 6 13 23 -
Source: European Commission, 2018.
Afterwards, we get TJ because of the summation of T
h
J across all households.
5.2.1 Assumptions and limitations
Income Data
As it is mentioned in Decoster et al. (2010), there may exist misleading results when
considering HBS income data at low income levels. This is justified by the fact that some
households have transitorily low incomes, as in the case of self-employed individuals. Con-
sequently, and to mitigate this concern, in this analysis we have not considered households
that (i) report non-positive income and/or (ii) who have an expenditure-to-income ratio
higher or equal to four. In the first case, no household were dropped from the sample. In
the second case, in the 2010 and 2015 HBS, 6 and 19 households were eliminated from
the sample, respectively.
Consumer Durables
Durables are infrequent purchases and the HBS data provides information on expendi-
tures, but also ownership of durable goods. Theoretically, in order to reduce a possible
overvaluation (or understatement) of households’ expenditures that were made during (or
outside) the period of the survey, the ideal situation would be to distribute the cost of
durable goods over its useful life. However, this would not be feasible because we would
need accurate information data on length of ownership. However, consumer durables were
included in the model, because otherwise we would underestimate households’ consump-
tion and tax revenue considerably.
Behavioral Responses
It is a well-known fact that taxes trigger behavioral responses, which may consist in
changed quantities, timing of purchase (Drenkard and Henchman, 2016) or location (Ka-
plan, 2017). Given that we only have access to a snapshot of consumer expenditure, we
cannot model behavioral responses. All our indices are based on a purely mechanical effect
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of the tax, assuming that the consumer demand is inelastic. Therefore, we are likely to
achieve less accurate results by not considering behavioral responses, when modeling large
changes in VAT rates (where significant responses in consumption behavior are likely). In
Table 8, the constant changes that occur in the Portuguese VAT Code are evident.
Tax Incidence
This microsimulation model assumes that the final consumer is the one who bears VAT
and excise taxes. Nevertheless, in some specific cases, these types of taxes may be less
than fully passed out to final consumers, or even more than fully. This assumption is a
standard one in this type of studies, used by Decoster et al. (2010), Leahy, Lyons and
Tol (2011) or IFS (2011).
Matching of households’ expenditures and corresponding tax rates
There are two commodities that were not included in our analysis: prostitute services
and narcotics. It is not possible to match these commodities with a corresponding tax
because they are not legal in Portugal. In addition, very few households report any kind
of expense in these categories, meaning that their exclusion does not have a significant
impact on results.
VAT Exemptions
VAT exemptions are assumed to have zero rates.
Excise Taxes
Estimating excise taxes is rather more complex. Excise taxes can be based on quantities
purchased or on commodity value. The HBS data includes the quantity of food and
drinks consumed by each household. Thus we have access to the amount of alcoholic
drinks consumed (beer and spirits), which are used to model the relevant excise taxes.
In the case of tobacco and oil products, there is no data on the quantity purchased.
Consequently, in order to simulate these taxes, average prices were used for each excise
good to estimate quantities from the HBS data (see Table 9). Here, we assume that both
expenditure information and average prices are accurate. Nevertheless, we may have some
inaccuracy at the individual level, since we are assuming that households consume higher
(lower) quantities than they actually do (some of them consume commodities that have
a higher (lower) price than average).
In addiction, we have to consider two additional assumptions: beer and spirits are
taxed at different rates because they depend on alcohol content. In our case, we as-
sume that all beer has at least 1.2% of alcohol content (and assume this equals 10 to
11 degrees Plato) and for spirits, the Portuguese Code of Special Taxes on Consumption
assumes a specific amount of euros per hectoliter consumed (from 1009,36e /hl in 2005 to
1251,72e /hl in 2014); in the case of tobacco products, we use only the ad valorem tax.
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Table 9: Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels
2005 4.7 4.4
2009 3.3 2.1
2014 3.1 2.2
Source: PORDATA.
6 Analysis by Income Deciles
In this section, we analyze the HBS data by income deciles, to better understand the
households’ consumption patterns over the years.
Table 10 describes the percentage spent on each tax level and reflects how households’
expenditure composition has changed. It is important to note that these shares include
the effect of changes in the tax level.
In 2005, households spent roughly the same on goods taxed at the reduced rate and
at the standard rate. As regards to households’ behavior by deciles, the shares are very
similar. In 2009, households spent more on goods and services taxed at the standard
rate, and this share is higher (lower) for the top (bottom) deciles. In this year, we
observe a clear income gradient. In 2014, the goods taxed at reduced rate became the
most consumed across all tax levels, although there is an unclear income gradient across
deciles. The highest share of reduced rate for poorest households happens in 2014 (almost
50%), showing a greater preference for essential goods and services.
The explanation for this result may be found in the variation of budget shares. Table
11 shows the variation of budget shares for six commodity aggregates, by income decile.
There is a clear income gradient across all categories and seems that in 2014, there is a
more concentrated expenditure of the poor in essential goods, such as food and housing.
In Section 3, the evolution of VAT rates was also analyzed (see Table 1), where we
verify the increasing VAT for all tax levels.
Briefly, we observe the following patterns: (i) VAT increased over time for all deciles,
(ii) between 2005 and 2009, households consumed less of reduced VAT rate goods (and
between 2009 and 2014, the opposite); (iii) in relative terms, poorer households tend to
spend more on essential goods, such as food and water, and on services such as education
and electricity; (iv) and the households’ expenditure composition has shown significant
variations over the years.
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Table 10: Shares spent on each tax level by income decile
2005/2006
Income Deciles
Tax Level 0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100
Reduced Rate 0,40 0,39 0,39 0,38 0,38 0,37 0,36 0,36 0,35 0,34
Intermediate Rate 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,08 0,09 0,08
Standard Rate 0,42 0,43 0,43 0,43 0,43 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,46
Excise 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,12 0,12 0,12
2010/2011
Income Deciles
Tax Level 0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100
Reduced Rate 0,34 0,33 0,32 0,31 0,29 0,28 0,27 0,27 0,26 0,26
Intermediate Rate 0,13 0,12 0,11 0,11 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,08 0,07
Standard Rate 0,46 0,48 0,49 0,49 0,51 0,52 0,54 0,55 0,57 0,59
Excise 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,09 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,08
2015/2016
Income Deciles
Tax Level 0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100
Reduced Rate 0,48 0,47 0,46 0,46 0,45 0,45 0,44 0,43 0,43 0,41
Intermediate Rate 0,10 0,10 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,10 0,12 0,11 0,12 0,12
Standard Rate 0,31 0,31 0,31 0,31 0,32 0,32 0,31 0,33 0,33 0,35
Excise 0,11 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,12 0,12
Source: Authors’ construction from HSB data.
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Table 11: Budget shares by income deciles
2005/2006
Income Deciles
Commodity 0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 0,195 0,186 0,179 0,182 0,169 0,164 0,156 0,150 0,138 0,125
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 0,024 0,020 0,020 0,022 0,020 0,019 0,018 0,014 0,014 0,012
Housing, water, electricity and fuel 0,328 0,331 0,335 0,330 0,319 0,319 0,316 0,308 0,309 0,306
Furniture and household services 0,028 0,030 0,030 0,031 0,031 0,032 0,032 0,034 0,036 0,054
Health 0,084 0,079 0,075 0,068 0,063 0,058 0,058 0,059 0,054 0,052
Education 0,013 0,014 0,015 0,018 0,019 0,021 0,026 0,027 0,031 0,032
2010/2011
Income Deciles
Commodity 0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 0,176 0,166 0,171 0,171 0,169 0,165 0,165 0,157 0,155 0,147
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 0,024 0,020 0,022 0,019 0,021 0,021 0,018 0,020 0,019 0,020
Housing, water, electricity and fuel 0,371 0,375 0,358 0,370 0,371 0,366 0,353 0,366 0,351 0,342
Furniture and household services 0,034 0,033 0,034 0,034 0,034 0,034 0,033 0,035 0,036 0,040
Health 0,074 0,076 0,075 0,069 0,065 0,061 0,067 0,064 0,066 0,062
Education 0,011 0,017 0,010 0,019 0,019 0,020 0,021 0,020 0,023 0,024
2015/2016
Income Deciles
Commodity 0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 0,200 0,201 0,200 0,196 0,200 0,191 0,187 0,193 0,191 0,172
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 0,022 0,028 0,028 0,027 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,028 0,024 0,023
Housing, water, electricity and fuel 0,414 0,410 0,402 0,387 0,375 0,366 0,352 0,348 0,337 0,306
Furniture and household services 0,038 0,037 0,037 0,040 0,036 0,041 0,042 0,041 0,040 0,046
Health 0,078 0,081 0,067 0,073 0,068 0,065 0,070 0,063 0,066 0,065
Education 0,016 0,015 0,015 0,016 0,017 0,017 0,018 0,019 0,019 0,022
Source: Authors’ construction from HSB data.
7 Results
7.1 Kakwani index & Progressivity curves
Figure 2 reveals how the Portuguese indirect fiscal system seems to be regressive. The
concentration curve for total indirect taxes is always above the disposable income curve
in 2005, 2009 and 2014.
The pattern expressed in Figure 2 can be confirmed by means of the Kakwani index:
−0.0846 (in 2005), −0.0572 (in 2009) and −0.1529 (in 2014). The lower (or more negative)
the Kakwani index, the less a tax is targeted at the poor households.
This result is in accordance with O’Donoghue et al. (2004), who find that Portugal
has a regressive indirect tax system.
Figure 3 reveals the surprising result that excise taxes are less regressive than VAT (in
2005 and 2009, there are even bottom quintiles where excise taxes are progressive). Even
though, this pattern is not evident in the overall results because excise taxes have a lower
weight when measuring the overall progressivity of indirect taxes, given the higher share
of tax revenues from VAT. This situation is similar to Russia, where Decoster (2005) finds
that excise duties are more progressive than VAT.8
8The Kakwani index of a sum of tax components is a weighted average of the indices of progressivity
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The Kakwani index in 2014 is equal to−0.1529, meaning that this year is the one where
the tax system presents a more regressive pattern. Taking into account the analysis of the
previous chapter, we perceive that the increase of regressivity in 2014 was accompanied
by an increase of the consumption of goods and services with reduced VAT rate.
Figure 2: Concentration and Lorenz curves
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Source: Authors’ construction, using lorenz, a Stata module to estimate and display Lorenz curves and
concentration curves (Jann, 2016).
7.2 The effect of reduced VAT rates as a redistributional tool
In this section, we examine the effectiveness of reduced VAT rates at supporting low-
income households.
The existence of goods taxed at reduced rates is usually grounded in socioeconomic
motives. This is based on the assumption that some basic goods, such as food, constitute
a higher percentage of consumption expenses for low-income earners. Thus, when poli-
cymarkers use the reduced VAT rate may be to avoid the regressiveness impact that a
standard VAT rate would produce. There are also other cases in which reduced rates are
of separate components. These weights are given by the percentage of components in total tax revenue.
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Figure 3: Progressivity curves by indirect tax structure
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Source: Authors’ construction, using Distributive Analysis Stata Package (DASP).
applied: the case of books or newspapers, in which there is a social concern in promoting
these type of goods (or at least, not hinder their consumption).
Reduced VAT rates are expected to have a progressive impact in the sense that they
give a higher relative tax reduction to the poor than to the rich. As Table 10 shows,
the bottom income deciles have always higher shares of expenditure on goods taxed at
reduced rates. However, because richer households consume more in aggregate terms than
poorer households, rich households can still be expected to gain more in aggregate terms
from a reduced VAT rate (though still less in relative terms). Furthermore, if a reduced
rate is provided for goods or services that the rich consume proportionately more of than
the poor then that reduced rate will have a regressive impact. In practice, the size of the
tax reduction from a reduced VAT rate will depend on the actual consumption patterns
of households, which are captured in the HBS data (Martins, 2006).
To investigate the distributional impact of reduced VAT rates, we use the same mi-
crosimulation model to simulate the imposition of the standard VAT rate on all items
currently subject to reduced or zero VAT rates. By means of the Kakwani index (see
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Table 12: Kakwani index
Actual VAT Simulated VAT
2005 - 0.0846 - 0.2764
2009 - 0.0572 - 0.2330
2014 - 0.1529 - 0.3375
Source: Authors’ calculations, using progres, a Stata module for assessing the distributive effects of an
income tax (Peichl and van Kerm, 2007).
Table 12) and progressivity curves (see Figure 4), we show that the reduced VAT rates
clearly reduce the regressivity of indirect tax system overall, having the desired “progres-
sive effect”.
8 Conclusion
In this work project, we have examined the distributional impact of the Portuguese in-
direct tax system and shown how the progressivity of Portugal’s indirect tax system has
evolved, by means of a microsimulation model. A set of different tools for study progres-
sivity have been used, such as progressivity curves and Kakwani progressivity index.
Our findings, using the Household Budget Survey data for the last three waves, show
a clear regressive incidence of the Portuguese indirect taxation, and 2014 seems to be the
year where the tax system had the highest regressivity pattern. It is also shown that there
was a significant change in the composition of expenditures per tax level. Additionally,
we investigated the distributional impact of reduced VAT rates and our findings suggest
that reduced VAT rates can reduce the regressivity of indirect tax system overall, having
the desired “progressive effect” that policymakers desire.
An important contribution of this work project is the analysis of tax progressivity
taking into account the two Autonomous Regions of Portugal. It has already been men-
tioned that both have slightly different tax systems compared to Mainland Portugal, and
considering this fact, we have got more accurate results.
The conclusions drawn from this analysis may encourage policymakers to apply fiscal
policies that can generate a higher impact on tax progressivity.
The main limitation of this work project is the quality of the data, given the high
possibility of measurement error. Kasprzyk (2005) identifies four sources of measurement
error in sample surveys: “the questionnaire, the data-collection mode, the interviewer,
and the respondent”.
This analysis could be extended in a number of interesting ways. One way to improve
this research would be to use a health survey, in addition to the HBS. Creating an ad-
ditional section based on health reports and focusing on excise taxes would allow us to
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Figure 4: Progressivity curves with actual and simulated VAT rates
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Source: Authors’ construction, using Distributive Analysis Stata Package (DASP).
check a possible “under-reporting on the distributional pattern of indirect tax liabilities”
(Decoster, 2005). This under-reported consumption of specific commodities generally oc-
curs when the respondents assess these commodities as “bads”. Decoster (2005) found
out significant differences between these two data sources.
Another way to improve this analysis would be to use the net-gross conversion proposed
by Farinha Rodrigues (2007) and implemented by Matos (2018), instead of using net-at-
source incomes, and to perform the decomposition of the indirect tax progressivity into
vertical, horizontal and reranking effects (see Braz and Correia da Cunha, 2009).
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9 Appendix
Figure 5: Density curves of equivalised disposable incomes
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Figure 6: Total tax liabilities as a share of total expenditure
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Figure 7: Progressivity curves
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Source: Authors’ construction, using Distributive Analysis Stata Package (DASP).
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Figure 8: Progressivity curves by NUTS
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Source: Authors’ construction, using Distributive Analysis Stata Package (DASP).
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